I recently talked to Stuart Hart about his new book, Beyond Shareholder Primacy: Remaking Capitalism for a Sustainable Future, published by Stanford Business Books in April 2024. Hart is a leading authority on how business strategy can address today’s environmental and societal challenges. He is a Professor in Residence at the University of Michigan’s Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise having founded the Erb Institute’s dual master’s program in the early 1990s. Since then he has held faculty positions and launched sustainable business centers at UNC’s Kenan-Flagler Business School and Cornell’s Johnson School of Management, where he is the S.C. Johnson Professor Emeritus. Most recently, Hart co-founded and was director of the Sustainable Innovation MBA (SIMBA) Program at the University of Vermont. Hart has also served as consultant, adviser, or management educator for dozens of corporations and organizations.
A lot of our conversation focused on how a historical perspective is crucial if we are to develop sustainable solutions. The economy we have today and our assumptions towards it are all social constructs shaped by historical cycles, and understanding these processes is essential to engage in productive change. In his book, Hart traces in detail three cycles of capitalism, and how objective functions, intellectual catalysts, and motive forces have shifted over time, in some instances dramatically. To give us an example, he explained how Adam Smith is often misunderstood, highlighting that in both Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith emphasized that businesspeople should act virtuously and focus on the common good, and that profit should be reinvested to hire and serve more people, not to accumulate private wealth.
Our discussion then moved to the topic of organizational interventions to address today’s fundamental environmental and societal challenges. We started by critiquing the traditional win-win logic that has for decades undergirded global sustainability efforts and then discussed how corporates can adopt societal purpose. Hart illustrated his points with a number of compelling examples including food manufacturer Griffith, Novelis, the aluminum company, and the Long Term Stock Exchange (LTSE).
Finally, we turned attention to a topic both of us are passionate about, business school reform. Hart spoke about his personal journey designing and founding a clean sheet sustainability focused MBA program at the University of Vermont, and the dual master’s program at the University of Michigan’s Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise. With decades of teaching, researching, and consulting experience, he emphasized reinvention rather than what have been the somewhat futile attempts to integrate sustainability into existing MBA programs and core courses.
Below is an edited excerpt from our conversation, where you can find more details on the themes introduced above.
Christopher Marquis: Great to talk, Stu. I really enjoyed your book and look forward to digging into it here. Two things I particularly found interesting are the historical work you’ve done, which was compelling, and also the discussion about business schools, given my background. I’m going to start with questions about the history, then ask about your ideas around organizational reform, and the final part will be about business schools.
First, a very open-ended question. Your book, particularly the first third, which is quite lengthy, delves into historical analysis of different eras and turning points for capitalism. Can you explain why understanding history is important and what we can take from this study for our present day?
Stuart Hart: I was quite concerned as the 2010s progressed, even before COVID hit about the state and trajectory of the world. Like many, I realized that much of my previous work over the past 25 or 30 years had focused on working within the current shareholder primacy model. How do you make the business case for sustainability? This has been the operative question for the last 25 years in the sustainable business space.
Unfortunately, it was becoming increasingly clear that this approach just wasn’t going to make it. We’d done a lot of greening and a lot of incremental improvement, but the global dashboard was still pretty much headed in the wrong direction. So coming to that realization, I was motivated to understand how could we have possibly gotten to this point. Obviously, this thing called capitalism, it didn’t start in the 1980s. I was motivated to understand where did come from and if there have been similar challenges in the past. I’ve read really widely, not just economic history, but also social and cultural history. My natural tendency as an academic is to try to find some kind of mental map or structure in all of that, and what that led me to is the realization that even though capitalism as a term only dates back to the mid-19th century, the source code for the practices, thinking, and organizing is really a 17th-century phenomenon. It dates back to the age of mercantilism.
From an organizational point of view, it started with the trading companies. I talk a lot about the British East India Company as the very first joint stock, limited liability corporation financed with private equity – back then it was called adventure capital – with the core purpose and focus being to make as much money as possible for the shareholders. It was the source code of both shareholder primacy and what we now think of as capitalism. Mercantilism was about extracting uncompensated resources, striking off on expeditions of “discovery” to the East, and then to the New World; helping yourself to resources and subjugating peoples where necessary. And ultimately, pursuing enslavement as a business modeland externalizing negative impacts. Over time, these practices reached extremes and unsurprisingly led to backlash.
In fact, there have been two previous periods of what I call a capitalist reformation, where capitalism is dominated by our “animal spirits,” reached extremes and there was pushback, motivated by what I think of as our “better angels.” Adam Smith was actually one of the first reformers. He was reacting to the mercantilist monopoly form of capitalism that was dominant during his time. He was absolutely revolted by those companies, and railed against their domination and excesses. In both Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments, he asserted that businesspeople should behave with virtue and should be concerned with the common good. And he went on and on about reforms that we probably need to make again today.
So I found it really quite enlightening that there were many things to learn from the past and I tried to tease those out to the extent that I could, throughout the first part of the book.
Christopher Marquis: Great, let me ask you a question about that. One of the things I really liked about your book is the diagrams that you have that encapsulate your argument in clear, compelling ways. For instance, the diagram on historical cycles of capitalism how you show the animal spirits and better angels that alternate over time.
The question I have is: one of the things I took away as an important lesson is that the economy and business philosophy that we have today, and the assumptions that we have, are not immutable. These are constructed by us as a part of this give and take between “better angels” versus “animal spirits.” And this is something that has been constructed by interested people. So things can be changed! Which is a fundamentally important lesson which I also discuss in my new book The Profiteers. What are some of the specific areas that we can learn from this historical arc in order to help us transform capitalism once again?
Stuart Hart: I think an important set of lessons can be found in the first reformation, which was driven by the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Smith’s world. Also, there are some important realizations from understanding more deeply the second reformation which came in response to the excesses of the Gilded Age and its industry concentration, wealth inequality, and environmental destruction.
In particular, I talk about Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’s work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. To me, one of the biggest “ahas” was that for the last 30 or 40 years in the current age of shareholder primacy we’ve been heavily influenced by the thinking coming from the Chicago School of Economics. With the idea of agency theory, which has underpinned this era, there are a set of assumptions about how managers think and behave, and that they require monitoring and control because they’re motivated by selfish interests, and they’re not going to behave in the interest of “owners,” which is presumably to maximize profits and shareholder value in the short term.
A key insight from Berle and Means’ work back in the 1930s takes precisely the opposite view. On the heels of the stock market meltdown, they realized that companies could be run with an entirely different logic, 180 degrees away from the current thinking about shareholder primacy and agency theory. They just saw it through a completely different conceptual lens, even though in many ways, they were facing the same kinds of challenges as we do today.
In the 1920s-30s, the economy was dominated by massive industrial corporations. The original founders, the so-called tycoons, had now passed from the scene and left their money to the foundations they created. These large corporations were now run by professional managers, who for the first time in history, were trained in business schools created by the tycoons specifically to skill up them up, but also to imbue them with a greater sense of ethical behavior and societal purpose. The tycoons knew that without social legitimacy, the anti-trust movement would take them down. For Berle and Means, rather than seeing these professional managers as a negative force needing control, they saw them as a kind of salvation. For the first time, we could imagine large corporations being run for the common good by professionally trained managers and executives behaving ethically — that was their conception of what they called “managerial primacy”—the opposite of shareholder primacy.
You had hundreds of thousands of small shareholders who owned stock in individual corporations for the very first time in history. Berle and Means’s observed that these small shareholders “manage not, invest not, nor do they accept liability.” So why should they receive the lion’s share of the returns?” They should receive – in their terms – the “wages of capital.” Think about that for a minute. Professional managers were the potential salvation because they could manage with virtue and corporations could be run in the public interest, with shareholders receiving the “wages of capital”—truly the residual claimants.
This vision of how corporations could be operated was diametrically opposed to our reality of the last 30 or 40 years—the current era of shareholder primacy. Indeed, during the postwar years— the years of my childhood— even though corporations had a lot of blind spots, like environment, women, and race, they were still run with the idea that their role in society was to build the middle class. My father grew up poor, and he served in WWII. When he got home, he received the G.I. Bill which enabled him to go to college and he got hired by GE which was dedicated to the practice of what was then called “welfare capitalism.” The rest is history! It’s just a completely different social construction of the objective function of business and it made it clear to me that there’s absolutely no reason why we can’t reconceptualize capitalism again.
Christopher Marquis: Yeah, totally agree. It’s been a long time since I’ve gone back to Berle and Means, but in my new book, I focus on the recent period and Michael Jensen’s work and Agency Theory. What’s interesting to me is that both of those sets of literature really have the same problem — the separation of ownership and control. Agency theory has gone down the path that managers will abuse corporate assets, so we need to have all these mechanisms to control them. For Berle and Means, it was much more about the purpose and mission. So through thoughtful, capable ethical managers, owners of businesses or shareholders, we can realize what the purpose of the company is. That rings true to me concerning what we need today. Being purpose-driven is the opposite of agency theory in many ways.
This is a useful stepping off point into the second set of topics I was interested in discussing —organizational interventions. In the discussion we just had, there are a lot of people focused on purpose and motivating companies for purpose. But so much of the discussion now tends to focus on how sustainability drives the financial performance of the firm. You criticize that view, as do I, the so-called “win-win” logic and argument. Can we start there? What led you to realize that idea wasn’t going to get us where we need to go? And what have you replaced it with?
Stuart Hart: Yeah, so as I said a little earlier, as the decade of the 2010s wore on, it became increasingly clear to me that we just weren’t getting there. I wrote an HBR article in the late 90s, Beyond Greening Strategies for Sustainable, where I laid out this two-by-two matrix—the Sustainable Value Framework. It outlined “greening” strategies, which were essentially incremental improvements to current products and processes, like eco-efficiency and product stewardship, and then “beyond greening” strategies, which were more about disruptive, leapfrog next-generation technology and creating new markets that serve and lift the underserved. That was written over a quarter century ago, but I still use the framework because it’s still tragically relevant. Companies haven’t really progressed beyond the “greening” agenda. Now, Scope 3 is the current discussion, which is really about product stewardship and life-cycle impact. Maybe some of the mandatory ESG reporting will require consideration of “double materiality” and “transition risk” which will push companies to at least talk about the “beyond greening” agenda, like how to get to tomorrow’s technology. But by and large, the business world has not moved beyond greening in 25 years largely because of the rules of shareholder capitalism that mitigate against making the kinds of long-term investments necessary to move into that space.
My thinking in the second part of the book was that there are things business leaders can do today to move more effectively in the direction of “beyond greening” and transformation. Some actions relate to larger systemic change, but some relate to bringing purpose to life more effectively within their own companies. One observation I make is that almost every large corporation today has created some kind of societal purpose statement. To put that in perspective, I thought back on my time teaching executive education at Michigan in the 80s and 90s. Back then, it was all about mission and vision, but the missions were almost entirely about how to encircle competitors and achieve competitive dominance. Over the last 10 or 15 years, societal purpose has risen to the top, so every large company now has a societal purpose statement—often very “flowery” in nature.
Increasingly, companies have also set sustainability goals. Some of these sustainability goals relate to larger things like net zero, but a lot of corporate sustainability goals are more about Scope 1 and 2, focusing on energy use, water use, and resource use—they’re more about eco-efficiency. Internally, there’s DEI stuff as well. That’s what sustainability strategy amounts to: a broad societal purpose statement and a set of sustainability goals. But if you look under the hood and examine how those things are connected, you realize that they really aren’t. There’s no practical connection between the statement of purpose and what the company actually does. The sustainability goals are generated mostly by sustainability people who try to make them come to life with operations, HR, and procurement people, but there’s no real important connection to the business side of the company.
So the second part of the book focuses on how to build what I call “business aspirations” as distinct from what I call “foundational” sustainability goals, which are mostly functional in scope— operations goals, procurement goals, HR goals, etc. There has to be another layer that connects to the strategy, the operating plan, and the resource allocation and investment plans for the company, or else it’s not real. How do you double-click on purpose and create actual business aspirations that involve the businesspeople in the company to pull sustainability through the business? It’s not a business aspiration unless there is revenue attached!
Then there’s a third level, the idea of a “corporate quest,” which relates more to larger system change. Oftentimes, “beyond greening” business aspirations are slowed down by the larger systemic context, including the short-term profitability demands of shareholder primacy. As a business leader, it’s possible to lead the charge for larger system transformation. People like Paul Polman have been talking about this for a while, starting at Unilever. The time has arrived for business leaders to step up and lead this change. In the book, I emphasize that a “corporate quest” should be material to the company. Many corporations fund STEM education and other good works which is great but falls more into the realm of CSR. A corporate quest ought to be something that’s on the critical path of where the company wants to go for the future, addressing the larger context in which they’re trying to play and changing it to accelerate their business aspirations.
Christopher Marquis: That is the three-circle diagram, from foundational goals, business aspirations, to a corporate quest. To put a little flesh on that, you had the example of Griffith, the food manufacturing company, and the purpose diagram, which is where I think a lot about internal alignment and purpose.
Regarding corporate quest, is there a company or two that you can use to help flesh that out a bit?
Stuart Hart: I think “Quest” is still a fairly underdeveloped space. Even in the Griffith example, they’re just beginning. It’s taken them three or four years to really socialize the business aspirations because that was brand new, and the business side of the company wasn’t very involved. They’re just now beginning to step up to the idea of what Quest means for them. Other companies, like Interface or Dow for example, have made broad statements about leading a “business revolution” or an “industrial reinvention,” but that’s very broad. The question is, what does that really mean? Many companies realize they need to step into the system change space, but they haven’t really conceptualized it in a practical way. Corporate Quest has to become practical, or else it’s just another version of CSR.
There’s also an organizational and human motivational component to all this; it has to be brought to life in a meaningful way for everyone in the company, or else it just doesn’t happen. It breaks down in execution because, you know, people at some level have to have an answer to the question of “what’s in it for me,” even down to people on the factory floor. So, I think the chapter in the book about “reinventing the corporate architecture” is really necessary because if all your time is focused externally on what needs to change in the world and what our business aspirations should be, it may all be great, but then you run into headwinds, and the company falters when it comes to actually making it happen. It builds on the work on strategy implementation and organizational change, and how to engage meaningfully the rank and file in the company to make it a fulcrum, not a push factor.
In the book, I focus on the case of Novelis, a new aluminum company, which resulted from the demerger of Alcan. Alcan had upstream mining operations, smelters, and so forth, which were sold off to Rio Tinto when it was demerged. Novelis comprised all the remaining downstream customer-facing assets, including rolling mills. After being packaged into a new company it was put back on the New York Stock Exchange where it foundered under current management. The company was then purchased by the Aditya Birla Group (ABG) in India, taking it private. Birla provided patient capital and hired a new CEO with imagination and a long-term vision.
The new CEO made it clear that it’s possible to think very differently about a company like Novelis. For many, not having any bauxite mines or upstream access to virgin aluminum was a disadvantage. However, this also presented a huge opportunity to create the world’s first aboveground mining aluminum company. The goal was a closed-loop system that aims to increase recycled content from roughly 20% to 80% within less than a decade—and cut greenhouse gas emissions by over 90% in the process. That became the audacious goal for this new company. And they were making significant headway. Just think about the transformation that’s required to do that. You have to build a global infrastructure to collect all forms of aluminum for recycling. They worked with customers to drive product innovation that employs closed-loop, fully recycled or largely recycled content, convincing Ford, for example, to make the F-150 pickup all-aluminum.
Novelis had the upper 10 or 20% of people heavily engaged in this vision, building the takeback infrastructure and planning new investments. But the rank and file weren’t really clued in; for them, it was easier just to make aluminum with prime the old way. So, it ran into headwinds. And they realized they had to take a step back; there was a change in leadership. They paused the 80% goal and the next five years or so came to be all about how do we engage the entire company? And how do we make sure we’re also building external relationships, external communities, so we’re not alienating customers or people upstream? It’s like, go slow to go fast again. And that, to me, was the important lesson of the Novelis case.
Christopher Marquis: That’s a good example. I’d also like to talk about your discussion of the Long-Term Stock Exchange. It’s an institutional innovation but also relates to obviously the institutional pressures on businesses for short-term performance and things like incentives. I also interviewed some folks there and included them in my new book. I would just love to hear a bit about your thoughts on the structure of the Long-Term Stock Exchange and perhaps also some of the hope or aspirations you have for that structure to help rebalance or reorient the system.
Stuart Hart: In the last section of my book, which is focused on institutional redesign for sustainability, there is a chapter titled: “redefining the meaning of value.” Looking at history, you realize that companies and society have defined value in very different ways over time; it wasn’t always just about maximizing shareholder wealth in the short term; there were very different kinds of definitions of what constituted value creation. And then, you look at the public equity markets in the US, and you realize how much they have changed over the last 50 or 60 years. Back in the 1960s and 70s, probably 20 or 30% of the transactions for the New York Stock Exchange were new investment in the form of IPOs. But with financial deregulation in the 80s and 90s, and the absolute explosion of things like derivative markets, we are now in a situation where the New York Stock Exchange is almost entirely a trading market.
New issues— IPOs and SPACs— are now less than 1% of the transactions. It’s virtually all trading. And then if you include share buybacks, which companies use to drive up the stock price in the short term, we are talking about close to a trillion dollars a year. IPOs and SPACs, however, are only around $300 billion a year. So public equity markets in the US are actually capital negative, they extract capital rather than contribute it.
If public equities are purely secondary trading markets, then there’s nothing at all preordained or sacred about quarterly earnings growth as the primary driver of stock price. It’s just a social construction. There’s a consensus that’s been built around it over the last 40 years, because we’ve trained all these people in business schools to think that way. They end up on Wall Street, they end up in private equity firms, they end up in consulting firms, they end up as analysts. The financial infrastructure has been programmed to think that’s how value is driven. That’s the expectation placed on listed companies. And so that’s what the managers of the companies are pressured to do — create quarterly earnings growth. But there’s nothing whatsoever permanent or preordained about that. Because it’s purely a secondary market, we can decide that different factors should be the drivers. It could be anything we want. It could be the reinvestment rate rather than share buybacks; it could be the carbon footprint of the value chain; it could be living wage; it could be anything that we say it is. It just really comes down to creating a new consensus about what the value drivers for the future should be if we are to create a truly sustainable form of capitalism.
And I was intrigued by the Long-Term Stock Exchange for that reason. Because that’s exactly what they are trying to do. They’ve run into some headwinds, but I think the original conception of it was spot on. Eric Ries, who wrote The Lean Startup, says the reason he did it is because he was tired of seeing entrepreneurs refuse to go public. Jerry Davis’s work shows that the number of publicly held companies is half of what it used to be 40 or 50 years ago. Startups don’t want to go public anymore, because they don’t want to lose control of their company to a 25-year-old MBA analyst on Wall Street. He viewed that as a big problem.
His idea was to create a new stock exchange that had a different objective function. To be listed on the Long-Term Stock Exchange, you have to demonstrate a long-term strategy, long term investment objectives, and a strategy that serves all the stakeholders. If you’re going to be an investor on the Long Term Stock Exchange, there’s no short term trading, you’re on board as a long term investor. And those are the rules of the game. And that’s the objective function for that new stock market.
Now, of course, there is a chicken and egg problem. How do you do attract companies and investors to begin with? My view was maybe this should be the go-to place for B Corps to go public. It also should be the place for large global corporations that are really trying to engage in the longer-term transformation. They should first joint-list, keeping their listing on the New York Stock Exchange and then over time, just go with the LTSE. Maybe that’s a way to really to think about it as creative destruction, that what we need are new public equity markets that are run with a different set of core premises, assumptions, and objective functions.
Christopher Marquis: Another major institution you cover in the book is business education, a place where you’ve spent 40 years.
Stuart Hart: Yeah. I started in 1985 as a professor at Michigan.
Christopher Marquis: And I started in 2005, so I am a little behind you. There’s been lots of discussion as long as I have been involved in change and for programs to become more sustainable. One thing that stood out to me is you encourage reinvention not integration. That there has been decades of a quixotic quest to ‘integrate’ sustainability into the core courses of incumbent MBA programs. I’d love to hear a little bit about this – if it’s not going to be integration, what would be the alternative? Take INSEAD, for instance, I’ve seen on their website they now have sustainability as part of every class. Whether that’s true or not, I’m not sure. But I’d love to hear what the alternative is to this, and also how to get there.
Stuart Hart: I started as an assistant professor of strategy in 1985 at Michigan. By the late 80s, I was growing weary of teaching the core strategy class as it was and I had a serendipitous opportunity present itself around 1990: new Deans in the business and environment schools voiced interest in creating a joint master’s program. I became the founding director of what is now the Erb Institute’s dual degree program (originally it was called the Corporate Environmental Management Program). And so starting the dual degree is what allowed me to make the jump to what became my life’s work.
In the 90s, the World Resources Institute that ran a program called the Sustainable Enterprise Program, which included an annual conference and it was all about core integration. The problem back then was we just didn’t have the teaching materials. The theory was if we could just develop the cases, readings, syllabi, and so forth, then, this content would just naturally be integrated into the core courses. But here we are 30 years later, we have lots of materials, we have lots of cases. And its still not in there, so clearly that’s not the problem.
Core integration has not happened in 30 years. And I would say that it won’t happen unless or until there is a level of seriousness and commitment to actually changing the way the core courses are taught. And that means more than just trying to coerce the core faculty into including one class in their core course that has a sustainability focus. I think that’s pretty much now happened, so probably a lot of business schools can say that there is sustainability in every core course.
But it’s really forced compliance for core courses to include one class out of 12 or 24 on their syllabus that has the word sustainability in it. If you talk to the students about their lived experiences, they will tell you that even that “sustainability” class really does not live up to the promise. The problem is that the faculty are human beings. And faculty just don’t want to look stupid. The core faculty know that their millennial and Gen Z students in the room probably know more about sustainability than they do. I think a lot of the core faculty know that these are real issues. They just don’t know enough about it to feel comfortable bringing it up.
Faculty are focused on getting tenure. And that means writing journal articles in their narrow field and minimizing their teaching preps and the amount of time they have to spend on teaching. If they teach the core, they get to load up on two or three sections of the same course. It’s one prep, they just want to take the teaching notes from the way it’s always been done and implement it, because they know the teaching ratings for that material have been pretty good. So why rock the boat? This is the path of least resistance. My way of thinking is that the only way you get core integration, if that’s the objective, is you must incentivize the faculty to learn the content. It has to be in their interest to expand their bandwidth. We thought about a teaching academy, where you get a certificate, where you’re paid to do it by your school. There could be a social networking element as well.
Truthfully, however, I think the only way it’s really going to happen is through reinvention. At Vermont, we created a program called the Sustainable Innovation MBA, which is a clean sheet redesign of the MBA. My experience in doing that was in order to build a new curriculum, you have to engage the faculty who are going to teach it. It’s like building the bridge as you walk on it. And that means the faculty become engaged in this enterprise. We did storyboarding of all the courses, and the faculty would see what all the other faculty were teaching and what the content and the deliverables were so you could see how the whole program would roll out. And there was some financial incentive for them to commit time and energy to it. They were going to be faculty for this new program. They were jointly developing it with each other. So that expanded their thinking, such that when they got into the classroom, they felt much more comfortable engaging these issues after having made the investment of time and energy to learn much more and expand their own thinking. That’s the way this works, I think.
When it came to the Sustainable Innovation MBA program, we had to initially hire a bunch of outside people because the existing faculty just didn’t have the range of capability and experience needed, even if they were willing to expand their knowledge. We didn’t have faculty that could do a bunch of what needed to be in the program. So we hired adjuncts. But over time, as the school has become known for this, new faculty hires came because of the SIMBA program. We’re able to in-load much more of the teaching of the program over time as the culture of the school changed.
The implications of this experience for incumbent— Top 10, Top 20— business schools and MBA programs is the best way to do this is say “let’s create a new competing MBA program.” Good companies create new products that compete with their existing ones, and expect that they succeed over time in creatively destroying the old. The traditional, 2-year, shareholder primacy-based MBA program is a declining product, so we need to be thinking in terms of this kind of creative destruction.
Why can’t incumbent business schools make the investment to create a new product, which is to say, a completely new MBA program, where you engage faculty from scratch in designing it just like we did, and stand it up and let it compete head-to-head with the existing program? If it’s any good, it should out compete the incumbent program over time. Our experience with the SIMBA program is that the number of applications is going up, not down. Whereas the number of applications year over year at the conventional two year MBA programs, even at the top 20 schools is downward. It’s a declining category. To me that would be a smart strategy: you’d want to stand up a new product that could over time creatively destroy the old product. That’s the path to the future.
Christopher Marquis: I’m totally on board with that. It means that there has to be a bold decision by business school leaders with the investment in actually making that happen. That way the faculty will see it as something that’s in their interest to do on multiple dimensions.
Unfortunately, we’re going to have to end there. But this is super important and interesting topic, I am very aligned with your points and and trying to push them at Cambridge. Your insights have given me a lot of thoughts on how to do so. Great to read through your book and also great to talk to so thank you for taking the time!
Stuart Hart: Much appreciated, Chris. Really thank you for doing this.
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